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In this brief, Defendant-Appellant will be called
"Defendant", Plaintiff-Respondent will be called "Plaintiff".
"R" stands for Record.
NATURE OF THE CASE
In connection with their 1977 divorcer the parties made
the property settlement agreement (the "Agreement") attached to
the Complaint.

During most of the 24 years of marriage, Defen-

dant had been President of Owanah Oil Corporation ("Owanah").
At divorce time, Defendant had control over valuable assets
(principally stock in Western Oil Shale Corporation, Cayman
Corporation

and Royalty Investment Company issued in various

names including Defendant's) much of which he claimed to belong
to Owanah and not to be marital estate.

When the Agreement was

signed, questions about what stock was marital estate and what
stock was Owanah1s had not been resolved.

The Agreement

provided that Defendant would, within one year, furnish an
accounting with respect to that ownership.

The Complaint

alleges Defendant failed to furnish the accounting, seeks to
compel it, and further seeks such damages as the Court finds
appropriate after the allegedly delinquent accounting is made.
Defendant claims to have made the accounting and thereafter to
have acted in reasonable reliance on express or implied
representations it was satisfactory.
DISPOSITION BELOW
The trial court held it didn't matter which property

-2was Owanah's and which was Defendant's because Owanah was
Defendant's alter ego, so all the assets which were to be the
subject of an accounting under the Agreement were marital
estate.

Since Owanah had converted most of its assets into

cash and used the cash in its business operations after the
divorce, the trial court ordered Defendant to pay Plaintiff one
half the amount realized from the sales.

Defendant is further

ordered to pay Plaintiff a percentage of the amount realized by
Royalty Investment Company when Royalty sold certain real
property.

As of the date of judgment, the total ordered to be

paid was $339,159.00. The trial court allowed no set-off for
stock represented by certificates held by Plaintiff's attorneys
for some time after the divorce and eventually delivered to
Plaintiff without Defendant's consent.

The trial court made no

disposition of Defendant's counterclaim.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant asks that the judgment appealed from be
reversed and the cause remanded with instructions (1) that the
accounting given by Defendant at the trial be recognized as
controlling, (2) that division of marital estate as established
by that accounting be ordered, and (3) that Plaintiff be
ordered to properly account for the proceeds of the sale of
real property as the Agreement requires and the counterclaim
demands.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Because the trial court based its judgment on a finding

-3that Owanah is merely Defendant's alter ego, it is of primary
importance that the Court be aware of undisputed evidence about
Owanah.

We will first review that evidence.

Secondly, we will

identify the evidence that Plaintiff has received all the
benefits contemplated for her by the Agreement which her
Complaint seeks to enforce.
A. The Nature of Owanah
Owanah is a corporation which began operations in 1952
to engage in oil and gas exploration (R.633).

The principals

were Francois de Gunzberg and Defendant (R.635).

In 1959, the

corporation was restructured to generate capital from
outsiders.

Each of the principals contributed $300.00 and had

his 300 previously issued shares "reissued" to him (R.635).

Of

the 300 shares to which Defendant was entitled under this
reorganization plan, 150 were issued to him (Ex. D.27, R.634)
and 150 to Plaintiff (R.634).

At that time, 600 additional

shares were issued to seven members of de Gunzberg1s family
(R.636).
unit.

The new stockholders purchased units at $500.00 per

Each unit was comprised of one share of stock at $100.00

and one $400.00 debenture (R.636,7).

The restructured

corporation began life, consequently, with $300,600.00 of which
Defendant had contributed $300.00.

Subsequently, Defendant's

brother, R.J. Colman, bought 121 shares at $100.00 per share,
and Defendant's sister, Marian Collins, bought 143 shares at
$100.00 per share (R.641,2).

On the Agreement's date, then,

there were 1444 Owanah shares outstanding held by 12 stock-

-4holders.

Plaintiff and Defendant together held approximately

20% of those shares for which they had contributed less than
one-tenth of one percent of Owanah's capital.
Owanah is now engaged in a sodium brine development
project located at the Carson Sink near Fallon, Nevada (R.637),
leasing the land from the Southern Pacific Railroad (R.637 et
seq, Ex. 36 f 37).

Owanah has spent in excess of $1 million

dollars on that project (R.689).

Of the money generated from

the sale of stock which Plaintiff claims were part of the
marital estate, every dollar has been deposited in Owanah's
account or the account of an Owanah subsidiary (Ex. D-34 covering 5 transactions in Cayman Corporation stock; Ex. D-40 covering 2 transactions in Western Oil Shale Corporation stock ) .
Defendant also mortgaged his Park City residence for $60,000.00,
applied part of the proceeds to the reduction of Owanah's debt,
and deposited the remainder in Owanah's account (R.787,8). Payments against the mortgage debt have since been made out of
Owanah funds (Ex. P-47, sheet 5, R.788).

Except for those

mortgage payments, the total amount paid to or for defendant
out of Owanah funds has been minimal, amounting in the period
from November 23, 1981 through November 26, 1982, for example,

1. These exhibits consist of brokers' confirmations that sales
of Cayman or Wosco stock were made for Defendant's or Owanah's
accounts. Attached to each confirmation is a bank deposit slip
showing the exact amount of the sale proceeds was deposited to
Owanah's account. The confirmations were produced by
Plaintiff, the deposit slips by Defendant.

-5to $22f695.25 (Ex* P-47, R.785 et seq.).

No other salary or

expense reimbursement payments were revealed by Plaintiff's
review of cancelled checks.
B.

Defendant's manner of conducting Owanah's business.
Defendant began borrowing money from First Security

Bank (the "Bank") for the conduct of Owanah's business in about
1952 (R.unnumbered page following 637) . At the beginning, he
made application for loans personally because Owanah's net
worth was so small the Banks preferred to deal with Owanah's
principals personally (R.unnumbered page following 637). and
because adjustments in personal loans could be made without the
time consuming formality of corporate resolutions (R.639).
Defendant continued that practice even after Owanah had
substantial assets, and he would list on the financial
statement as "his" property anything in which either he or
Owanah had an interest (R.640).

The Bank was aware that the

loans were for Owanah's use because the loan proceeds were
deposited in Owanah's account (Defendant's testimony at R.639,
coroborated by the Bank's Mr. Hansen at R.448,9).
Defendant similarly avoided taking stock and leases in
Owanah's name, even though the acquisitions were with Owanah's
funds, including the $325,000 contributed by outside shareholders in 1959, because brokers and purchasers required
corporate resolutions supporting sales (R.639), and resolutions
would entail signatures of people living in Massachusetts and
France.

Defendant nevertheless scrupulously deposited all

income from sales of property he recognized as Owanah's - even

-6though held in his name or street name - in Owanah's bank
accounts (Ex. P-34, Ex. P-40).

Plaintiff's attorneys reviewed

bank statements and cancelled checks for Owanah accounts for
several years (R.757) and found only the checks itemized on
Exhibit 47 as evidencing payments to or for Defendant as
distinguished from checks made for clearly corporate purposes.
The Exhibit 47 checks are the only evidence of salary or
expense reimbursement paid to Defendant for acting as president
of Owanah.
C.

The Agreement
The parties were divorced in 1977 after 24 years of

childless marriage during which Defendant was the source of
Plaintiff's support (Agreement/ R.7 f 1f8) .

Putting aside

questions about which securities under Defendant's control were
a part of the marital estate and which were not, the
Agreement's property settlement strongly favors Plaintiff in
that:
(a) Of three homes acquired by the parties during
marriage (one on Walker's Lane in Salt Lake and two in
Edgartown) she was given two as well as half the
proceeds from her sale of the third (Agreement, R.13,
Is 1, 10, 12).
(b) She was given all stock held in her name
(Agreement, R.13 IfT) including 150 shares of Owanah
(R.479) .
(c) She was given the parties entire interest in a

-7building lot in Edgartown (R.15 1fl8) .
(d) She was given one-half of all other realty in
which the parties were known to have an interest
(Agreement, R. 13-16).
(e) She was given one-half of any stock owned by
Defendant (R.13 1f7) and, in the event any of that stock
was pledged to secure "any personal or corporate loan",
he was obligated to pay off the indebtedness (R.14).
(f) Despite having been given more than half the
agreed marital estate, she was given alimony of $500.00
per month (R.7 If8>
P. The Accounting.
Within one year after the Agreement, Defendant did
furnish an accounting as the Agreement requires by making the
same explanation to Roe & Fowler about the source of funds for
acquisition of the stock and other property as he made to the
Court during trial (R.419, 727-729).

He made the explanation

to Paul Landis of the Roe-Fowler firm, and made the kind of
record Mr. Landis thought appropriate (R.419).

In connection

with the accounting and at the time of the divorce, all the
certificates then in the parties' safety deposit box were taken
out of the box, delivered into the custody of Roe & Fowler and
kept by Roe & Fowler for implementation of the terms of the
Agreement

(R.727).

On August 27, 1978, shortly after the year within which
Defendant was required to account, Roe & Fowler released some

-8of the certificates in its custody to Defendant.

To document

the release, Roe & Fowler prepared a "Receipt" for Ovanah's
signature, not Defendant's (R.47,48, R.729, Ex.P-8).

That

receipt declares that the shares released are "owned by
Owanah."

An original is retained by Roe & Fowler (Ex* P-22).

Between August 27, 1978 (when Roe & Fowler released certificates to Owanah) and May 29, 1980, (when the Complaint was
filed), Plaintiff made no demand on Defendant for further
accounting and in no way indicated dissatisfaction with the
accounting provided (R.728) .
E. What the accounting shows about ownership of disputed
property.
The dispute is over the ownership of Cayman Corporation
stock, Western Oil Shale Corporation stock, and real property
in Cache County known as the "Anderson Ranch."
Western Oil Shale Corporation ("WOSCO") Stock
The Wosco stock was issued in about 1964 in consideration of Owanah's transfer to Wosco of Owanah's interest in
oil shale leases for which Owanah paid the filing fees and
rentals (R.690).

The shares were issued, at Owanah's request,

in various names other than Owanah's so Owanah could more
easily sell or otherwise deal with it. (R.639,691).

Defendant

claimed ten percent of 22,560 shares so issued, or 2,256
shares, as his compensation from Owanah for making the deal
(R.692).
shares.

He admits Plaintiff is entitled to half of that 2,256
No part of the funds expended to acquire or maintain

-9the leases transferred to Wosco came from the parties1 personal
accounts.
Cayman Corporation ("Cayman") Stock
The Cayman stock was issued by Cayman as consideration
for the transfer to Cayman of all outstanding shares in
National Oil Shale Corporation (R.642).

The National Oil Shale

shares had previously been issued to its stockholders as
consideration for the transfer to National Oil Shale of oil
shale leases which had been acquired by Owanah and Max Lewis
(R.646), and an oil and gas lease with a producing oil well
which had been paid for by James Menor, Dale Coenan, and R.J.
Colman (R.647).

The oil shale lease rentals had been paid by

Owanah (R.648, Ex.D-30, Ex.D-31).

When National Oil Shale

certificates were issued, all those representing consideration
for the oil and gas leasef 1500 shares, were issued to
Defendantf but he took them as trustee for Menor, Coenan and
R.J. Colman (R.647), and he satisfied his fiduciary obligation
to the beneficiaries (R.652).

The National shares issued as

consideration for the oil shale leases were issued to Max Lewis
and his family members and to Defendant (R.643, Ex.D-28).

The

shares were issued to Defendant rather than to Owanah for the
same reason Owanah took most of its assets in officers or
street name.

When Cayman shares were issued in exchange for

National shares, the Cayman certificates were issued to the
persons named on the National certificates submitted for
exchange.

-10Anderson Ranch
The Anderson Ranch was never owned by either Owanah or
Defendantf it was owned by Royalty Investment Company
("Royalty").
(R.721).

Royalty was formed as a corporation in 1958

It acquired a contract to purchase the Anderson Ranch

in about 1962 (R.722) some 15 years before Defendant bcame an
officer and director (R.721).

The installment payments on the

Ranch were made by R.J. Colmanf M.G. Collins and Owanah
(R.722).

As a result of their having made those payments and

having assigned royalties to Royalty, R.J. Colman, M.G. Collins
and Owanah became entitled to 62-1/2 percent of the outstanding
stock in Royalty (R.549 et seq). None of the money for making
installment payments came from Defendants personal funds
(R.723).
In January 1982, Royalty sold the Anderson Ranch for
$250,000.00 and authorized the proceeds to be utilized by
Owanah in the Carson Sink development (Ex. P-48, R.777)f
Royalty having an option to demand the return of its money plus
interest or take a 4% overriding royalty interest in product
from the project (Ex.P-48). The trial court ordered Defendant
to pay Plaintiff a sum equal to one-half of 62 1/2% of the
amount Royalty realized from the sale of the Ranch.

-11ARGUMENT
POINT I
"ALTER EGO" WAS NOT AN ISSUE FRAMED BY THE PLEADINGS
OR OTHERWISE PROPERLY BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT FOR
RESOLUTION, AND THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN
BASING ITS DECISION ON AN ALTER EGO LEGAL THEORY.
The entire foundation of the judgment in this case was
the trial court's finding that "the corporation is merely
Defendant's alter egof and the assets claimed to be owned by
Owanah Oil Corporation are in fact owned by Defendant" (Finding
No. 14, R.371; memorandum decision R.266).

No alter ego issue

was, we submit, raised by the pleadings or tried by express or
implied consent of Defendant.
The Complaint in this matter alleges that Defendant
failed to furnish to Plaintiff an "accounting of stocks owned
by him or in which he has any interest", ^nd seeks to compel
one.

It is noteworthy that the evidence indicates no question

about the identity of the stocks to which the accounting would
relate.

The stock was represented by certificates some of

which were delivered to and kept by Roe & Fowler and the
remainder of which were held by the Bank as security for a
loan.

Defendant's testimony is undisputed that he delivered

all the certificates from the parties' safety deposit box to
Roe & Fowler and told Roe & Fowler about the pledged
securities.

The Agreement itself recognizes that certain

stocks "owned by" Defendant might have been collateralized for
"personal and corporate loans."

If any of that loan collateral

-12is Defendant's stock, the Agreement says, the payment of the
loan will be Defendant's responsibility, and Plaintiff will get
her half free of the loan burden.

That provision is consistent

only with an understanding that the loans were really corporate
obligations, should have been secured only by corporate
property, and that Defendant's stock was marital estate free
from such obligation.
The case presumably went to trial on the issue framed
by the pleadings: Had Defendant furnished an adequate ccounting
identifying which of the stocks in Roe & Fowler and Bank
custody at the time of the Agreement belonged in the marital
estate and which did not?

The expectation was that, if Judge

Dee concluded the accounting was not adequate, he would order a
more painstaking or better verified accounting and defer any
ruling on damages until an accounting to his specifications was
made*

In the course of trial, Defendant testified about the

accounting he had furnished, explaining to the Court as he had
to Plaintiff's lawyers that most of the property in question
had been acquired in the course of Owanah's operation using
capital contributed by outside investor stockholders.

His

testimony was corroborated by the evidence that all proceeds
from sale of any stock by Defendant or Owanah had been
deposited in Owanah's account and used for Owanah's purposes.
The only contrary evidence was that he had listed the stocks
and other property on his financial statements as his property
when borrowing money which everyone knew was for Owanah's

-13purposes and which was deposited in Owanah's account.

The

Court found thatf even assuming everything Defendant said was
true, all the property in question was still marital estate
because Owanah is merely Defendant's alter ego*
The pleadings do not frame an alter ego issue.

It is

not alleged that there is such "unity of interest and
ownership" with respect to the property in dispute that the
separate identities of Defendant and Owanah should be ignored.
It is not alleged (nor does the evidence show) that Plaintiff
believed or relied on representations that the stock in
question was all Defendant's and none Owanah's so that gross
inequity would result from recognizing the separate identities
of Owanah and Defendant.

At no point in the course of trial
i

did Plaintiff's counsel use the phrase "alter ego".
Interrogation of Defendant at trial and before was always
directed toward eliciting from Defendant an explanation of his
justification for listing as his property assets he really
believed to be Owanah's, and to lead him to say something which
could be construed as an admission against interest.

Nothing

about the interrogation put Defendant on notice that an alter
ego theory would suddenly be expressed after the parties rested
and the trial was concluded.
While Rule 15 is liberally construed to free litigants
from legalistic restrictions in the presentation of their
causes, it does not justify the introduction of new theories of
action after the evidence is in.

In Mitchell v Palmer, 240

-14P.2d 970, 1210 245 (1952), the Plaintiff undertook to set aside
certain deeds on the grounds of fraud in inducing their
execution. At trial, Plaintiff attempted to adduce evidence of
non-delivery.

This Court held the Plaintiff was properly held

to the legal theory expressed in her Complaint.
A number of federal cases have held that implied
consent to the trial of an unpleaded issue will not be inferred
merely because evidence relevant to the unpleaded issue, as
well as an issue framed by the pleadings, was introduced
without objection.

An unpleaded issue is not tried by implied

consent unless it is obvious from the evidence being offered
that the offering party intends to raise a new issue.

In MBI

Motor Co. v Lotus/East, CA Tenn 1974, 506 F.2d 709, the Court
said it must "appear that the parties understood the evidence"
relating to the unpleaded issue "was aimed at the unpleaded
issue."

This is not the case when the evidence in question is

also relevant to pleaded issues.

Avco Corp. v Am. Tel & Tel,

DC Ohio 1975, 68 FRD 532, Wirtz v FM Sloan, DC Pa 1968, 285
F.Supp. 669, aff. 411 F.2d 56.
In two recent cases, Pohl Const. Co. v Marshall, CA 10
1981, 640 F.2d 266, and Cioffi v Morris, CA Fla 1982, 678 F.2d
53 9, the federal courts have ruled that implied consent will
not be found if the Defendant could have offered additional
evidence had he been aware of the unpleaded theory.

In this

case, Defendant could have adduced evidence that Plaintiff was
always aware that most of the stock in question was acquired

-15with Owanah assets including the capital of outside investors
and that Plaintiff did not regard it as marital estate.
Defendant was unable to do so because Plaintiff was not present
at the trial.

Defendant would not have waived her attendance

if he had been aware that judgment would be sought on any
previously unexpressed legal theory.
POINT II
EVEN IF ALTER EGO HAD BEEN PUT IN ISSUE, THE EVIDENCE
CANNOT SUSTAIN THE FINDING MADE BY THE TRIAL COURT.
This Court hasf in recent yearsf considered three cases
in which alter ego was the basis of trial court judgment,
Dockstader v Walker, 29 U.2d 370, 510 P.2d 526, 1973; Norman v
Murray First Thrift, 508 P.2d 1028, Utah 1975; and Centurian
Corp. v Fiberchem Inc., 562 P.2d 1252, Utah 1977.

In each of

those cases, a trial court judgment based on alter ego findings
was reversed, or a trial court refusal to apply alter ego was
affirmed.
The circumstances which must co-exist to justify
application of the alter ego doctrine are best stated in
Norman.

Using language which recurs in cases from many
2
jurisdictions, this Court there said:
To disregard the corporate entity, there must be a
concurrence of two circumstances: (1) there must be
such unity of interest and ownership that the separate
personalities of the corporation and the individual no
longer exist...and (2) the observance of the corporate

IT. Cases discussing alter ego concepts are digested in the
West System under Corporations Key 1.4. There are hundreds
digested in the Ninth Dicennial alone. Norman well capsulizes
their teaching.

-16form would sanction a fraud, promote injustice, or an
unequitable result would follow.
A.

Is there unity of ownership in this case?
For the most part, unity of ownership and interest is

found only where allf or practically allf of the stock in the
corporation is owned by the individual.

In Dockstader, this

Court observed that the alter ego doctrine is generally applied
where the corporation is a "one man corporation in the sense
that the individual owns all or practically all" of the stock.
In that situation, there is, of course, "unity of ownership and
interest" since there is no third party who can assert a right
to share in the profits of corporate enterprise or the proceeds
from liquidation of corporate property on dissolution.

The

unity of interest requirement has occasionally been satisfied
by a showing that third party stockholders hold stock under
fiduciary obligation to the dominant stockholder.

We find no

cases, however, upholding a unity of ownership finding where
the individual owns a small minority of the outstanding shares,
and the third parties holding the majority of the shares
contributed most of the corporate capital.

In this case,

Defendant owns about ten percent of Owanah1s shares, and the
majority shareholders contributed 99% of the corporate capital.
By finding unity of ownership and interest as between Owanah
and Defendant in this case, the trial court ruled as a matter
of law that Owanah's majority shareholders had no interest or
ownership in the property acquired with their capital.

-17B.

Where are the equities?
A great many cases emphasize that the mere fact that

the individual owns all the stock (Ramsey v Adams, 603 P.2d
1025, 4 Kan App 2d 662, 1979) or is the dominant influence in
forming corporate policy (Goetz v Goetz, 567 SW 2d 892, Tex
1978) does notf by itselff justify disregarding the corporate
entity.

There is nothing illegal or contrary to public policy

about a corporation's being a one man operation.

It is only

when the individual uses the corporation to achieve an illegal
or fraudulent objective that courts will undertake to pierce
the corporate veil.
Norman speaks in general terms of the alter ego
doctrinefs purpose to promote equity.

The cases which treat

specifics almost universally require a plaintiff to prove the
elements of fraud.

In Roderick Timber Co. v Willopa Harbor

Cedar Products, 627 P.2d 1352, 29 Wash App 311 (1981), the
court declared that the separate identity of the corporation
will be honored "unless its recognition serves to perpetrate
some form of injustice, which typically involves fraud,
misrepresentation, or manipulation to a creditor's detriment."
In Centurion Corp, (supra), this Court characterized what a
plaintiff must prove as "something akin to fraud."
While the evidence in this case may show that Defendant
misrepresented his assets to the Bank, it certainly does not
show any misrepresentation to Plaintiff.

There is no evidence

-18that she ever saw any financial statement submitted with an
Owanah loan application.

She neither alleged nor testified

that Defendant ever represented to her that all the stock in
dispute was his and none Owanah's.

She neither alleged nor

testified that Defendant ever spent any of the parties1 money
to acquire Cayman or Wosco stock, to acquire royalty interestsf
or to make Anderson Ranch payments*

She has provided no

evidentiary basis for her contention that her claim to the
assets in controversy is superior to the claims of the other
Owanah shareholders who contributed so much more to corporate
capital than she did.
The evidence does not show any manipulation of
corporate assets resulting in Defendant's enrichment or self
aggrandizement. On the contrary. Defendant has utilized all
proceeds from corporate property sales in attempting to realize
corporate objectives, and Owanahfs success will benefit
Plaintiff, who holds more Owanah shares than Defendant, more
than it will benefit Defendant.
managing the corporation.

He has been paid minimally for

It is inconceivable that, had

Defendant considered the assets which were sold to have been
his personal property, he would have deposited all the sales
proceeds in Owanahfs account.
It is difficult to perceive the injustice which will
result if the corporate identity is honored in this case.
Plaintiff will have received, even if the judgment is reversed,
her support during 24 years of marriage, a house on Walker's

-19Lane in Salt Lakef a house in Edgartown, a building lot in
Edgartownf half of all real and personal property Defendant, as
distinguished from Owanahf owned, and $500.00 per month in
alimony.
It is not difficult to perceive, however, the injustice
which will result from this Courtfs sustaining the trial
court's judgment.

Defendant has risked all his assets, as well

as Owanah's, on the Carson Sink project.
house in Park City to keep Owanah solvent.

#e even mortgaged his
The one asset on

which Plaintiff can presumably execute is the Carson Sink
plant, in which the trial court has declared Owanah's
stockholders other than the parties have no interest.
Plaintiff, who has made no investment at all in Owanah or the
project, will then take, under what was ostensibly a divorce
decree, everything of value which has derived from the
investment by others of more than $300,000.00.

She will have

achieved that goal, moreover, in an action to which Owanah was
never named as a party, and in which the investors were never
served.

The investors had no reason to suppose their invest-

ment was in jeopardy and no chance to defend it.
The trial court in effect held that, when a loan
applicant files a financial statement with a bank, he
guarantees the accuracy of the statement to all the world.
Moreover, any property represented to be the applicant's on his
statement becomes his as a matter of law without regard to what
the public records may show and without regard to the equities

-20of third parties*
POINT III
BY APPLYING ALTER EGO, THE TRIAL COURT HAS CONSTRUED
THE AGREEMENT TO EFFECT A PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION OUT OF
HARMONY WITH THE PARTIES' INTENT.
The Complaint in this action prays for (1) an order
compelling Defendant to accountf and (2) for such damages as
the accounting shows Plaintiff to have sustained.

The

fundamental judicial concern, consequently, is to assure that
the "equitable" distribution of their property which the
Agreement contemplates is achieved*

By applying alter ego

doctrine here, the trial court has construed the agreement to
achieve a distribution which could never have been intended by
Defendant, and which is much more favorable to Plaintiff than
she, on the evidence, could rationally have expected,,
It is simply beyond credit that Defendant would
voluntarily have consented to the division of property which
occurs if the corporate entity is disregarded.

Even if the

corporate entity is honored, Plaintiff received, under the
Agreement, significantly more than half of the property which
is unquestionably marital estate, and she is awarded $500.00
per month alimony.

If the corporate entity is ignored, she

receives in addition one half of all property acquired by
Owanah in the utilization of outside investor capital in some
15 years of operation.

Not only does she realize that bonanza,

she realizes it free of obligation to pay any of the debt which
corporate property had been pledged to secure.

-21It is clear from the language of the Agreement and
Plaintiff's subsequent conduct that she anticipated no such cut
of Owanahfs assets.

The Agreement recognizes that there is
3
corporate debt and stock pledged to secure it. If any of
that stock is shown by Defendant's accounting to be Defendant's
personal propertyf says the Agreement, Defendant will assume
the responsibility of freeing it.

Such provisions are

consistent only with the parties' understanding that, as
between themf it was not fair for marital estate property to be
pledged for corporate debt.
Finally, there is the convincing evidence of Exhibit
P-8 that, within the time frame contemplated by the Agreement
for accounting, Plaintiff acknowledged that stock held by Roe &
Fowler was corporate property.

Throughout the period of

attempted implementation of the accounting provisions of the
Agreement, Plaintiff demonstrated her recognition that there Is
an Owanah, that its property is to be differentiated from
Defendant's, and that Defendant's responsibility is only to
establish the basis for differentiation.

3. The Agreement was prepared by Plaintiff's attorneys.
Defendant was never represented by counsel. Consequently this
instrument should be construed, everything else being equal,
most favorably to Defendant.
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POINT IV
PLAINTIFF IS ESTOPPED TO DENY THAT DEFENDANT FURNISHED
AN ADEQUATE ACCOUNTING SATISFACTORY TO HER
A.

Review of facts relating to estoppel
Defendant testified that, within the year the Agreement

gives him for furnishing an accounting, he met with Paul Landis
of Roe & Fowler, gave him the same information and documentation about property ownership as he gave the court at trial,
and left with the understanding that Roe & Fowler, at least,
were satisfied with his identification of marital estate property and his explanation for categorizing all other property
of concern as Ownah's.

On August 27, 1978, approximately a

month after the year had expired, Owanah asked Roe & Fowler to
release some of the certificates held by that firm as having
been established to be Owanahfs property.

In the interim

between the Defendant's meeting with Mr. Landis and the August
27 request, there was adequate time for Plaintiff to have been
apprised of the accounting and express any dissatisfaction.
Roe & Fowler did not, in writing or otherwise, dispute
Owanah1s right to the certificates sought to be released.
certificates were released to Owanah and their receipt was
documented by an instrument prepared by Roe & Fowler which
declares the released stock to belong to Owanah.
That conduct by Plaintiff, through her lawyers, has
implications beyond the context of the release transaction.

The

-23Roe & Fowler held the certificates to assure that, when the
accounting was furnished, there would be certificates readily
available for delivery to Plaintiff.

The release of any of

those certificates would make no sense unless Plaintiff was
satisfied that the remaining certificates covered what she was
entitled to receive as marital estate.
It is undisputed that Plaintiff's attorneys were fully
aware of the stock held by the Bank and that, however it was
listed on Defendant's financial statements, it was pledged for
personal and corporate debt.

It is unconceivable that she

could have believed Owanah would not continue to use the
pledged assets as it always had unless she raised some
objection to the accounting.

Owanah in fact paid the secured

debt, sold much of the stock, and spent the proceeds on the
Carson Sink development.

It is of critical significance, we

submit, that all of the utilization of Wosco and Cayman stock
by Defendant for Owanah occurred contemporaneously with
Defendant's furnishing an accounting to Roe & Fowler and
obtaining a release of part of the stock escrowed with them.
Defendant proceeded on the assumption that his accounting was
satisfactory, and that Owanah was justified in using the
property now claimed by Plaintiff
purposes.

for Owariah's business

One wonders what else Plaintiff or her attorneys

expected when they released Owanah stock.

Moreover, for

two

years after the accounting was due under the Agreement (and was
furnished according to the undisputed evidence) and almost two

-24years after Plaintiff, by releasing escrowed stock, implied her
concurrence in the accounting, Plaintiff did nothing to suggest
that she disputed Defendants identification of marital estate.
She made no demand for additional documentation, and she
certainly gave no indication of her present contention that no
accounting at all had been furnished.
B. Application of estoppel doctrine to facts
The concept of estoppel in pais is that one should not
"be permitted to speak against his own acts, representations of
commitments to the injury of one to whom they were directed and
who reasonably relied thereon11 (28 AmJur 2d 629, Estoppel §28).
This Court has had frequent occasion to comment on the
doctrine and identify its elements.

The most concise and

comprehensive statement is the following from Morgan v Board of
State Lands, 549 P.2d 695, 1976:
Estoppel arises when a party by his actions, represensentations, or admissions, or by his silence when he
ought to speak, intentionally or through culpable
negligence, induces another to believe certain facts to
exist and that such other, acting with reasonable
prudence and diligence, relies and acts thereon so that
he will suffer injustice if former is permitted to deny
existence of such facts.
The Washington Court explains the doctrine in language which
more precisely applies to the circumstances of this case.
Equitable estoppel may arise where there exists a
statement or act inconsistent with a later asserted
claim, an action by the relying party on the faith of
such statement or act and resulting injury to the
relying party if the party making the representation
were permitted to contradict or repudiate the statement
or act. City of Mercer Island v Steinmann, 513 P.2d 80,
9 Wash.App. 479.

-25The elements of estoppel are (1) representation and (2) reasonable reliance resulting in detriment.
The Representation
It is well settled that the representation giving rise
to estoppel need not be express; it may be inferred from the
positive conduct or silence of the party against whom it is
asserted.

Morgan v Board of State Landsy (supra); Grover v

Garn, 23 U.2d 441, 464 P.2d 598f 1970.

In this casef the

evidence shows both affirmative conduct inconsistent with
Plaintiff's present claim and silence in the face of an
obligation to speak.
Plaintiff's claim as expressed in her complaint is that
Defendant failed to furnish an accounting.

As expressed in her

post trial memorandum for the first time. Plaintiff's claim is
that there is no Owanah, Owanah being only Defendant's alter
ego.

The fact that Plaintiff released a part of the escrowed

stock and did so by a document which declares Owanah's ownership of that stock is inconsistent with her present claims that
no accounting had been furnished and that no Owanah exists.
The release and Receipt confirm not only that the parties
negotiated their settlement with an underlying understanding
that there jjs an Owanah whose property is to be differentiated
from Defendant's, but also that the whole point of accounting
was to make such differentiation.
Estoppel arises here, however, not only from
Plaintiff's affirmative act acknowledging that an accounting

-26has been made, that escrowed stock should be released on the
basis of that accounting, and that Owanah has independent
existence, it also arises from Plaintiff's silence for two
years when she must be presumed to have known that Defendant,
as Owanah's president, would be using Owanah1s assets in the
conduct of Owanahfs business unless Plaintiff asserted her
ownership.

She said nothing to Defendant or, so far as the

record shows, to the Bank about any claim of right to pledged
stock which survived Defendant's accounting.

On the evidence,

she cannot deny that she knew about the stock in Bank custody.
The Agreement speaks about pledged property, and Defendant's
testimony that he told Mr. Landis about the pledged stock is
undisputed.
On the legal implications of silence, the authors of
American Jurisprudence say this:
Estoppel by silence or inaction is often referred to
as estoppel by "standing by", and that phrase in this
connection has almost lost its primary significance of
actual presence or participaton in the transaction and
generally covers any silence where there are knowledge
and a duty to make a disclosure* The principle
underlying such estoppels is embodied in the maxim "one
who is silent when he ought to speak will not be heard
to speak when he ought to be silent." Silence, when
there is a duty to speak, is deemed equivalent to
concealment. Moreover, there are cases where the mere
silence of the estopped party and his failure to assert
the right later claimed will be construed as a
representation that he does not have the rights which
he later attempts to assert. 28 AmJur 2d 666 Estoppel
and Waiver §53
Defendant's Reliance
There can be little question about Defendant's

-27reasonable reliance on the release of escrowed stock as an
acknowledgement that Owanah owned it*
Receipt says.

That's exactly what the

Had the certificates not been released, Owanah

could not have sold the shares and used the proceeds in Carson
Sink development*

Defendant also reasonably interpreted Plain-

tiff's failure to object to his accounting, particularly when
she released escrowed shares based upon it, as a concurrence in
its identification of marital state.

There is no contradiction

in the record of Defendant's testimony that he made the
accounting, made it within the year prescribed, and documented it as Mr. Landis asked.

There is no suggestion in the

record that Mr. Landis is unavailable to testify.

Plaintiff's

Exhibit 22 shows that Roe & Fowler took the Exhibit 8 Receipt.
The record reveals no effort by Owanah or Defendant to dispose
of any property until the accounting was made and its adequacy
impliedly acknowledged.

Only then did Owanah undertake to

convert property into cash and all the cash was deposited in
Owanah's account and used for corporate purposes.
Finally, it is appropriate to comment on the significance of Plaintiff's intent when she released the stock
and remained silent when she knew what property Defendant had
identified as marital estate.

It is not essential for

invocation of the estoppel doctrine that the party sought to be
estopped had an intent to deceive.

It need only be true that

the representation related to a fact which the party claiming
estoppel might assume to be true and act on that assumption.

-28Kelly v Richards, 95 Utah 560f 83 P2d 731f 129 ALR 164f 1938.
Plaintiff impliedly represented that Defendant's
accounting was satisfactory and that Owanah and Defendant have
separate identities.

Defendant relied on that representation

in dealing, as Owanahfs president, with property accounted for
as Owanah1s.

If Plaintiff is allowed to repudicate her

representation, Defendant will suffer injury in the amount of
the judgment against him in this action.
It is not fair or even conscionable to permit Plaintiff
to wait for more than two years after the accounting should
have been and was made, see what disposition of property was
made, and then decide whether to claim all that property as
marital estate.
POINT V
THE ORDER REQUIRING DEFENDANT TO PAY PLAINTIFF AN
AMOUNT REPRESENTING A PERCENTAGE OF THE PRICE FOR WHICH
THE ANDERSON RANCH WAS SOLD IS WITHOUT SUPPORT IN THE
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, OR EVIDENCE.
The evidence that title to the Anderson Ranch was, at
the time of the parties1 divorce, vested in Royalty Investment
Company is undisputed.

Plaintiff presumably claims that

Royalty held that title in some kind of trust capacity, and
that the parties had a beneficial interest.

When Royalty sold

the Ranch, under Plaintifffs legal theory, Royalty had an
obligation to distribute the proceeds to the cestuis and no
authority to extend the trust by managing the sale proceeds for
the cestuis.

The trial court ordered Defendant to pay

Plaintiff one-half the amount which it expressly or impliedly

-29found should have been distributed by Royalty to Owanah or
Defendant.
That segment of the judgment is erroneous in these
respects:
1.

The basis for any claimed trust is not set out in

the Complaint or any amendment to it.
2.

There is no finding or conclusion which establishes

the legal basis for any Royalty obligation to distibute to its
shareholders the proceeds from any sales of its property.
3.

The entity claimed to have violated the trust is not

made a party to the suit.
4.

The only evidence of beneficial interest held by

the parties is Defendant's testimony thatf because Owanahf R.J.
Colman

and M.C. Collins contributed money with which payments

on the Ranch were made, they were entitled to 62 1/2% of the
"stock" or "equity" in Royalty.

The judgment, without

evidentiary justification, assigns all of R.J. Colman1s and
M.C. Collins' interest to Owanah and consequently to Defendant.
5.

While there jLs a finding that Owanah is Defendant's

alter ego, there is no finding that Royalty is.

There is merely

a finding that Defendant "held title to 62 1/2% interest in the
Ranch through Royalty Investment Company."
The trial court's ruling, carried to its logical
extreme, sets a precedent which leads to absurdity.

Plaintiff

is entitled under the judgment to half of Owanah's stock in
Royalty, and she retains her equity as a stockholder in any

-30property Royalty acquired with the proceeds of the Ranch sale.
Nevertheless, said the trial court, every time Royalty sells an
asset. Defendant must pay Plaintiff one half of 62 1/2% of the
sales price.

In every case, then, where stock is distributed in a

divorce decree, the defendant may be ordered to pay the plaintiff
some percentage of the price received by the stock issuer whenever
the issuer sells any of its property.
CONCLUSION
The Judgment in this case effects a property
distribution which could never have been in the parties1
contemplation when they made the Agreement, and it distributes to
Plaintiff property in which Owanah's investor stockholders have
vastly stronger ownership equities than Plaintiff without
affording them opportunity to protect themselves.

On both

procedural and substantive grounds, alter ego was improperly
applied.

The judgment should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted this 22nd day of August, 1985.

'Fr&nk J. Allen ( J
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
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